Developing Surveys in Space Support Environments
Many of the risk factors found in the organizational risk literature apply to space environments and can be used to develop survey items. (See especially the literature regarding High-Reliability Organizations-HROs) [9] [10], Generative Organizations [11] , and Learning Organizations [12] .) There also are risk factors specific to aerospace domains that are important to assess, as will be discussed throughout this paper. However, we have found that the more the survey is tailored to the specific domain, the more useful the information it yields. Therefore, it is helpful for the survey designer to become familiar with the domain through standard ethnographic techniques of observation and interviews. It is essential to collaborate on the survey with future respondents-those with something to say. In addition, it is important to collaborate with the managers. What do they want to know? What decisions do they have to make? Answers to these questions will help in the construction of relevant and useful survey items.
We have found that most engineers and scientists in space environments are comfortable with taking electronic surveys via email or on the web, and prefer this method to paper and pencil surveys. Items can be phrased as statements and rated using Likert-type scales, e.g., frequency of occurrence on a five point scale. We recommend that free text spaces be provided next to the rating items so that respondents can elaborate if they choose to do so. An alternative is to provide space for comments for a whole section.
Analysis of Risk Factors at Multiple Levels
Risk factors can be identified at multiple levels of an organization and can exert their effects at higher or lower levels [13] . Organization-wide, team-level, and individual level risk factors can be addressed in a survey. Obviously, management decisions made at the organizational level influence the operational effectiveness of both teams and individuals.
Organization-wide Risk Factors
Factors influencing organizational decision making. Factors such as schedule, cost, and pressure from governmental bodies have been shown to play a critical role in decisions that have contributed to spacecraft accidents. In both the Challenger and Columbia investigations, it was determined that schedule concerns overrode safety concerns. One way to ascertain the prevalence of this pattern in ongoing missions is to ask respondents to rate how often they think various factors play a role in upper management decisions. Respondents can also be asked to rate how often the same factors play a role in their own decisions and recommendations. These data can be used to measure the extent to which schedule and other factors are perceived as playing a role at different organizational levels, how they A possible survey format is shown in Figure 1 . 
Figure 1. Possible survey format for assessing the perceived frequency of various factors in organizational decision making (by upper management and self).
Organization-wide characteristics. As discussed earlier, there have been many studies on organization-wide risk factors. Features associated with high-reliability organizations relate to organizational values, policies, and safety practices. Examples of survey items that capture these risk factors are the extent to which:
• goals are shared throughout the organization,
• relevant information gets to the decision makers-including "bad" news,
• management respects those who spot problems,
• management is responsive to problems that are pointed out,
• decisions are being made at the correct level, and
• rapid response teams are formed to deal with unexpected crises.
Other items involve the extent to which the organization is "blame-free" in its response to identified safety problems, i.e., is an organization in which mistakes are investigated to identify cause, not to cast blame.
Obviously, an organization's policy in this regard affects the willingness of mission personnel to create and benefit from "Lessons Learned" databases instead of hiding the errors that will inevitably occur. An example of items that tap organization-wide safety practices, along with a rating form and space for comments, is shown in Figure 2 .
Throughout the mission, how often do you think the following occurs?
Never ---Always
Comments?
Relevant information gets to the decision makers.
Appropriate task teams are promptly formed to deal with unexpected crises.
People who spot and elevate problems are respected by higher management.
Management is responsive to problems that are pointed out.
Mistakes are investigated to identify cause, and not to cast blame.
Those making technical decisions which affect my work are knowledgeable in the area.
Spacecraft history, decisions, and rationales are easily accessible.
Figure 2. Example of survey items that tap organization-wide safety culture
Survey items that are especially important to space support environments are the last two items in Figure 2 , "Those making technical decisions which affect my work are knowledgeable in the area," and "Spacecraft history, decisions, and rationales are easily accessible." Being able to access the written history and rationales of previous decisions enables one to assess the risks involved in current decisions.
If written rationales are not accessible, personnel must rely on verbal rationales, which can become distorted over time and can degenerate into "We've always done it this way," or "We've never had a problem with it." Access to accurate information on spacecraft history, decisions, and rationales also mitigates the consequences of attrition and creates "corporate memory." Other items to include in this section depend on the structure of the mission. For example, if multiple groups were participating in the mission, such as contractors or international partners, it would be important to assess the extent to which information flows freely between these parties. 
Individual Risk Factors
Back-up. A major risk factor in organizations is specialized knowledge being only "one deep." To uncover areas where expertise is thinly stretched, respondents can be asked whether there are people who can back them up in case they get sick, and if so, how many people. They can also be asked whether there are areas where they think there should be more "back-up," i.e., more people with knowledge in an area, and if so, which areas. Whether respondents trust their supervisors also is important.
Obstacles to effective work. Respondents can be asked to rate the extent to which there are obstacles to their work effectiveness. Many factors such as crowded working conditions, computer incompatibilities, and communication issues with on-site and off-site colleagues can severely compromise work effectiveness and hence contribute to risk. Other obstacles might be bureaucracy, contract negotiations, and reporting requirements.
Risks in Information and Technology Support
Documentation and databases. Accurate, up-to-date, and accessible documentation and databases are essential to ensure safe mission operations. We have found that it is helpful to list the names of the documents and databases used in a domain and to provide ratings scales for both their accessibility and accuracy, as well as room for free text comments. It is useful to list even the documents that are known to be accessible and accurate, because the ratings for these documents provide a baseline for comparison with other documents.
Software/hardware. Software/hardware issues are extremely important in space operations and have contributed to many spacecraft accidents [23] . Input must be sought on the quality of software development, the thoroughness of its testing, and its ultimate adequacy and robustness. Again, it is essential to provide free text spaces adjacent to rating items.
Possible new or improved tools. New and improved tools can fill technology gaps and reduce risk.
Surveys can elicit suggestions for new or improved tools for both computational and support tasks. Areas to inquire about include the types of analyses helped by the suggested new tool, the capabilities of the new tools, the number of hours currently spent on tasks, and the number of hours saved with the new tools.
Perceived Organizational Vulnerabilities
It is important to provide space for respondents to state in their own words what they perceive as the most important organizational vulnerabilities in their environment, what the consequencesmight be, and what they would suggest to remedy these vulnerabilities. Also valuable to managers are the respondents' ratings of how serious these vulnerabilities are, and the degree to which they affect the respondents personally. There are two advantages to including these responses on the survey. First, they allow new concerns to percolate up, concerns which might not have been tapped by the interviews used to develop the surveys. Second, they enable one to assess the relative importance of the organizational vulnerabilities that have been rated earlier in the survey.
Conclusion
Space operations are extremely risky and hence the support environment must be monitored continuously for vulnerabilities. Surveys are one tool for doing this effectively, especially if they have been designed in collaboration with individuals working within the space domain and are a vehicle for transmitting information from those who want to be heard to those who want to hear. In this way surveys can help identify vulnerabilities before they become critical.
